When Schools Speak About Employees: Defamation and Immunity After a Student-Safety Incident

Margaret M. Cooney, Esq., (412) 594-5548, mcooney@tuckerlaw.com

Dorothy A. Lanza v. Mark Getz, et al., No. 5285 CV 2025 (Crt. of Common Pleas of Monroe Co. 2026)

ABSTRACT

In Lanza v. Getz, et al., the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County sustained the Stroudsburg Area School District’s preliminary objections, in effect dismissing the defamation complaint of a district employee against the school district, superintendent, and a district principal. The decision highlights the broad protections Pennsylvania public school districts possess against defamation suits and reinforces the right of districts to communicate with parents and guardians about incidents affecting students’ safety and welfare.

BACKGROUND

In Spring 2025, Mark Getz, the principal of Hamilton Elementary School in the Stroudsburg Area School District, learned that a group of first-grade students had returned to class from their lunch period with blue painter’s tape over their mouths. Lunch monitor Dorothy Lanza, a district employee, admitted she had distributed pieces of the blue tape to a group of children who she deemed had become “unnecessarily noisy” and required tape to “keep quiet.” Lanza claims that after handing tape to the first graders, “some of the students may have placed those pieces of tape over their own mouths while playing.” Upon learning of this incident, Principal Getz wrote a letter to all parents and guardians of children enrolled in the elementary school, advising them that “some students were observed to have blue painter’s tape on their mouths placed there by a staff member during lunch today.” Principal Getz communicated that the staff’s behavior was not expected or directed by the district, that a full investigation was underway, and that the safety and well-being of the students was the district’s top priority. In time, Principal Getz’s letter reached local news outlets, which reported the story, including components of Principal Getz’s statement. The story also gathered attention on social media. As a result, Dorothy Lanza sued the district, the superintendent, and Principal Getz for defamation, alleging that the district’s statements falsely stated that Lanza, herself, placed tape on the students’ mouths when she claims she only handed tape to the students. Lanza claimed that the district’s publication of this false statement caused harm to her reputation and subsequent eligibility for employment in other school districts. The district defendants, including the principal and superintendent, filed preliminary objections seeking dismissal of portions of Lanza’s complaint for legal insufficiency. The Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County granted the defendants’ preliminary objections, which had the effect of dismissing Lanza’s complaint in its entirety. The court granted Lanza leave to amend her complaint to raise any claims for violations of her civil rights.

DISCUSSION

The district succeeded in obtaining dismissal of the defamation suit because of the court’s application of several well-settled principles of Pennsylvania law.

First, the court recognized that the Hamilton Elementary School was not a proper defendant to the suit because the school was a subsidiary of the school district, not a “legal entity separate and apart from the district.” The court reiterated that “in the absence of any evidence that the school is a legal entity separate from the district, there is no basis to name the school as a direct defendant.”

Next, the court examined Lanza’s claims for defamation in the context of Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, a state statute which provides broad immunity to civil personal injury suits for any local governmental agency except in specific enumerated categories. Specifically, Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act provides, “except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8541. Under the Tort Claims Act, the only types of injury claims that may proceed against a local agency are for acts of a local agency or its employees relating to: 1) vehicle liability; 2) care, custody, or control of personal property; 3) real property; 4) trees, traffic controls, and street lighting; 5) utility service facilities; 6) streets; 7) sidewalks; 8) care, custody, or control of animals; and 9) sexual abuse. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8542(b).

Because defamation is not one of these nine enumerated exceptions to immunity, Lanza’s defamation claim could not proceed. The court reiterated the longstanding Commonwealth Court rule that “school districts are immune from suit in a cause of action sounding in defamation.” Petula v. Mellody, 631 A.2d 762, 765 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1993). Accordingly, the court dismissed Lanza’s defamation claim against the district.

The court then turned to Lanza’s claims against the individual defendants—the superintendent and principal. Sections 8545 and 8550 of the Tort Claims Act provide that individual employees of local government agencies are liable for civil injury damages under the Act to the same extent as their employer, except that if the employee’s actions constitute a crime, actual fraud, malice, or willful misconduct, the employee will not enjoy any of the Act’s immunity. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8545, 8550. While Lanza had claimed that the principal and superintendent had acted maliciously and with deliberate indifference to her reputation when they published their statement, the court looked beyond Lanza’s conclusory assertions to the actual nature of her claims. Because the essence of Lanza’s claims was that the individual defendants failed to conduct an appropriate investigation before distributing the letter to parents, the claims actually “sounded in negligence” rather than malice or willful misconduct. In other words, because Lanza’s allegations were that the defendants harmed her through omissions of reasonable care rather than intentional acts, Lanza had claimed no more than negligence. Because the employer school district could not be held liable for negligence under the Tort Claims Act, neither could the individual defendants. Likewise, Principal Getz’s statement that he was still investigating the matter contradicted a finding that he had any deliberate intent to injure Lanza. Likewise, the court held that the superintendent was entitled to absolute immunity from civil suit for actions in his official duties because he is a “high public official.” Accordingly, the court dismissed the defamation claims against the principal and superintendent.

Lastly, the defendants challenged whether Lanza could satisfy the first threshold element of a defamation claim, which is that the communication at issue is “capable of defamatory meaning.” In other words, the statement must produce such an effect on the intended audience that it tends to “blacken” the plaintiff’s reputation or expose the plaintiff to “public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” The court reiterated that when analyzing this question, the alleged defamatory statement must be viewed in its factual context, not in a vacuum. Additionally, only statements of fact, and not expressions of opinion, can form the basis for a defamation action. Applying these principles to the district’s statements about Lanza, the court held that the district’s letter to the parents was not capable of a defamatory meaning. Central to the court’s conclusion was that the district’s statements did not identify Lanza by name or position. As such, there was no reason parents and guardians reading the district’s letter would, from its language, conclude that it referred to Lanza; and, therefore, the statement itself would not have blackened Lanza’s reputation. Accordingly, the court granted two preliminary objections dismissing Lanza’s defamation claims because the allegedly defamatory statement would not have been understood by parents as referring to her.

PRACTICAL ADVICE

This decision offers several important lessons for public school districts when communicating with parents/guardians about employee conduct:

1. Communicate promptly but emphasize that investigation is ongoing. This case supports a district’s ability to notify parents about a serious student-related incident while investigation is still underway, particularly where the communication is framed as an institutional response focused on student safety and policy compliance. The court in Lanza repeatedly noted that the principal’s letter stated the matter was being investigated, emphasized student well-being, and did not purport to give a final adjudication of employee wrongdoing. These factors evidenced that the principal did not make the statement with malice or intent to defame Lanza. The takeaway for public districts is to keep communications factual, limit statements to necessary information, and expressly acknowledge when facts are still being gathered.

• Do not unnecessarily identify the employee in parent/guardian communications. A central point in the court’s analysis was that neither the principal’s letter nor the superintendent’s statement identified the responsible employee by name, and the court found no reason parents would necessarily understand the statements as referring to her. That lack of identification helped defeat essential elements of the employee’s defamation claim. As a practical matter, school districts should generally describe the incident and the district’s response without naming the employee or including details that would readily single the person out, unless disclosure is clearly necessary or otherwise legally required. Avoid exaggerated or accusatory language that could invite an argument that the district official acted with malice or intent to harm an employee’s reputation.

• Route communications through the superintendent. In Lanza, the district benefitted from the immunities provided by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and Pennsylvania common law (i.e. court precedent). The court applied the “high public official” common law doctrine to hold that the superintendent was personally immune to liability for statements made in his official capacity, leading to the superintendent’s dismissal from the case. Districts should route sensitive communications through the superintendent, when practical, or other appropriate administrators, and should ensure the communication plainly falls within the administrator’s official duties.

For questions regarding school district communications, employee-related investigations, or the application of governmental immunity protections, please contact Margaret Cooney at (412) 594-5548 or mcooney@tuckerlaw.com.