Sex-Segregated Athletics in Schools and the Limits of Title IX

West Virginia v. B.P.J., 225 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (2026) (Supreme Court ruling affirming that states and educational institutions may lawfully restrict female athletic teams to biological females without violating either Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause.)

BACKGROUND

This case arose from West Virginia’s enactment of the Save Women’s Sports Act, codified at W. Va. Code § 18-2-25d, which defines sex by biological criteria and limits participation on female athletic teams to individuals who are biologically female. B.P.J., an 11-year-old, now 16-year-old teenager living in West Virginia, was born a biological male who identifies as female. B.P.J. socially transitioned to female in third grade, adopted a new name, and soon began taking puberty blockers to prevent male puberty. B.P.J. also began taking hormones in sixth grade and was looking forward to trying out for the girls’ cross-country team as she prepared to start middle school. Shortly after the passage of the Save Women’s Sports Act, B.P.J. was informed by her principle that she could not participate on the girls’ cross-country and track-and-field teams.

B.P.J. filed suit in federal district court against the West Virginia State Board of Education and other state and county education officials, as well as the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission. The suit challenged W. Va. Code § 18-2-25d on two grounds: first, that the restriction violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded education programs; and second, that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To protect B.P.J.’s ability to compete during the pendency of the litigation, a preliminary injunction was issued that barred the state from enforcing its biological-sex sports restrictions against her during adjudication.

The district court in the Southern District of West Virginia subsequently granted summary judgment to the state on both claims, holding that the law was permissible under both statutory and constitutional frameworks and dissolving the injunction that allowed B.P.J. to compete on female sports teams at school.

B.P.J. appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for emergency relief, where the Court reversed on the Title IX claim, reinstated the injunction, and remanded the equal protection claim for further factual development to determine the extent to which B.P.J.’s sex assigned at birth creates a meaningful competitive athletic advantage over cisgender girls. The Fourth Circuit held that laws excluding transgender children from school sports triggers intermediate scrutiny under the equal protection clause, and that the ridged categorical exclusion of all transgender students was not substantially related to the legitimate interest of promoting competitive fairness and preserving athletic opportunities for female students. West Virginia sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.

The Supreme Court consolidated B.P.J.’s case with a parallel challenge from Idaho. Idaho had enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, codified at Idaho Code Ann. § 33-6203, which similarly prohibited biological males from competing on female sports teams. In that case, Hecox, a biological male who had transitioned after undergoing male puberty, sued after being barred from female collegiate sports under the Idaho statute. The federal district court in Idaho issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the law, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and heard them together.

DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of West Virginia and Idaho, rejecting both the statutory and constitutional challenges. With Justice Kavanaugh writing for the majority, the Court held that neither Title IX nor the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from maintaining sex-segregated athletic teams defined by biological sex.

The Supreme Court first concluded that the West Virginia law does not violate Title IX. The Court declined to extend the holding of Bostock v. Clayton County, which had addressed employment discrimination under Title VII. B.P.J. had argued that because Bostock held that discrimination against transgender individuals constitutes discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII, the same analysis should apply to Title IX. The Court disagreed, emphasizing that Title VII and Title IX operate in fundamentally different contexts. While Title VII generally prohibits employers from treating employees differently based on sex, Title IX explicitly contemplates and permits sex-separated athletic programs. The Court further reasoned that separate sports teams for biological males and biological females are “reasonable” based on safety and competitive fairness concerns.

The Supreme Court also concluded that the West Virginia and Idaho laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the equal protection doctrine, sex-based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny, meaning they must be substantially related to an important governmental interest. The Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit in acknowledging that the West Virginia and Idaho laws do classify by sex, triggering this standard of review. However, the Court diverged from the Fourth Circuit’s holding and concluded that the states’ interest in ensuring competitive fairness and safety for female athletes is important, and that categorically limiting female teams to biological females is substantially related to achieving those objectives. The Court found that the physical differences between biological males and biological females, particularly the advantages conferred by male puberty, provide a legitimate basis for maintaining entirely separate teams.

Notably, the Court held that there was no need for individualized exceptions for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones, regardless of how biologically similar hormone treatments may have made them to a cisgender female. The Court opined that these inquiries remain “the subject of ongoing medical and scientific debate,” and as such, they defer to the legislature to make reasoned decisions in this area.

The Court was careful to limit the scope of its holding. The decision addresses only the athletic context under Title IX and does not extend to other sex-segregated spaces such as bathrooms, locker rooms, or other school facilities. The ruling also does not disturb the distinct legal framework governing employment discrimination claims under Title VII, which remain subject to the Bostock analysis in workplace settings.

PRACTICAL ADVICE

West Virginia v. B.P.J. is part of a broader national trend of state legislation restricting transgender participation in athletics, with over twenty states enacting similar laws between 2020 and 2026. The decision effectively settles the federal constitutional floor, giving states wide latitude to define eligibility by biological sex in school sports. It also signals a potential divergence between Title VII employment protections and Title IX educational contexts, suggesting that courts may apply different standards to transgender rights claims depending on the statutory and factual setting. Whether this framework will come to extend beyond athletics to other sex-segregated spaces, such as restrooms, locker rooms, and housing, remains an open question that lower courts will likely confront in the coming years.

For questions about how this decision may impact your school district’s athletic programs, student eligibility policies, or Title IX compliance, please contact Alexa Shapiro at (412) 594-5558 or ashapiro@tuckerlaw.com.